The problem of hypothesis testing is approached as an estimation problem rather than a 0-1 decision problem, using a loss function to evaluate estimation rules. The theory developed is quite general, and contains standard (NeymanPearson) testing as a special case. Viewing hypothesis testing as estimation allows for formal evaluation of data-dependent frequentist measures of evidence.
Introduction
Approaches to hypothesis testing have usually treated the problem of testing as one of decision-making rather than estimation. More precisely, a formal hypothesis test will result in a conclusion as to whether a hypothesis is true, and not provide a measure of evidence to associate with that conclusion. In this paper we consider hypothesis testing as an estimation problem within a decision-theoretic framework, and are able to arrive at some interesting conclusions. In particular, reasonable loss functions result in decision rules that can be regarded as measures of evidence and, under these loss functions, some interesting properties of p-values emerge.
Standard Approaches
Classical hypothesis testing is built around the Neyman-Pearson Lemma (Lehmann, 1986) and results in decision rules that are 0-1 rules (except for randomized tests). These formal tests, although optimal in a strict frequentist sense, have been criticized from many different directions. Firstly, there have been many Bayesian criticisms (e.g., DeGroot, 1973; Dickey, 1977; Berger, 1985) which point out the drawbacks of the stringent conclusion of the Neyman-Pearson approach. Namely, the experimenter is locked into a two-point action space. Secondly, the assessment of accuracy of the test is typically a pre-data assessment, most often the size of the test. This estimate can be quite unreasonable when view postdata, a criticism which has also been leveled at Neyman-Pearson theory by conditionalists (Kiefer, 1977; Robinson, 1979) . Alternatives considered by Kiefer include using p-values as an assessment of the likelihood of the null hypothesis. These ideas are in the direction of those proposed here, that the hypothesis test should result in a post-data assessment of evidence. (In fairness to Neyman-Pearson theory, measures of size and power were proposed as pre-data operating characteristics, not post-data assessment of accuracy, of a testing procedure.)
Perhaps the most serious criticism of Neyman-Pearson testing arises from the actions of practitioners. That is, formal Neyman-Pearson theory is not widely used in practice. Subject matter journals are flooded with p-values, but not with the outcomes of an a-level test.
Furthermore, the p-value is implicitly used as a measure of evidence for a hypothesis. One of the reasons for undertaking the research presented here was to answer whether there are reasonable scenarios in testing for which the p-value is a reasonable answer. The fact that it is used extensively by experimenters is given; we, as statisticians, should decide whether the p-value has acceptable properties.
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Criticisms of p-values
Most criticisms leveled at p-values have come from the Bayesian school, although there have been others. Even though p-values can be similar to Bayesian posterior probabilities, there are many seeming defects to criticize. Since the p-value is, in many cases, of the form p(x) = P( T(X) > T(x) ), where T(x) is the observed value of the random variable T(X), there is the problem of averaging over unlikely sample values (which have not occurred).
Moreover, this is in violation of the likelihood principle (Berger and Wolpert, 1984) , which states that inference must be based only on the observed data.
Even though p-values can fall within the range of Bayes solutions (Casella and Berger, 1987) , they are fundamentally different. This, in itself, is not a cause for concern, as good frequentist and Bayesian procedures may be different, but there have been many criticisms involving paradoxes (e.g., Lindley, 1957; Berger and Sellke, 1987; Berger and Delampady, 1988) . These paradoxes are all based on the fact that, at the tails, the p-value may be much smaller than Bayesian posterior probabilities in the two-sided testing problem. In the onesided problem, however, this paradox does not appear (Casella and Berger, 1987) , as the pvalue is a limit of Bayes rules (see also Schaarfsma, et al., 1989) . This observation may seem to be at odds with the previous paragraph, where we noted that the p-value violates the likelihood principle, something not done by a Bayes rule. The agreement of p-values and Bayesian posterior probabilities, however, is a mathematical identity specifying the agreement of two different integrals. Foundationally, the calculations are different.
The different behavior of the p-value in the one-sided and two-sided problem is one reason for the present investigation. This different behavior suggests that the formulation of the problems themselves may be to blame. For example, difficulties arise in the Bayesian formulation of the two-sided point null testing problem, or the classical two-sided composite null problem. A decision-theoretic formulation of testing may answer our concerns in these cases, and possibly clear doubts about p-values.
Other than Bayesian criticisms, problems with p-values can arise within classical statistics. (A strict Neyman-Pearson frequentist despises p-values with even more fervor than a Bayesian, as p-values have no real roots in frequentist theory. However, through their widespread use they are closely associated with classical, rather than Bayesian, statistics. It is thus the job of the frequentist to deal conclusively with p-values.) In some cases, p-values may be difficult to define (see the binomial example in Berger and Delampady, 1988, p.324) , but if the p-value is defined in a straightforward way, it is usually from some NeymanPearson optimal test. The problem here is that many users implicitly and wrongly assume that any optimality derived from the Neyman-Pearson Lemma can be transferred to data-dependent measures of accuracy. Although there has been some investigations about the behavior of p-values using loss functions (Gutmann, 1984; Schaarfsma, et al., 1989; Thompson, 1989) , there has not been any systematic evaluation of post-data frequentist measures. There is a need for such an evaluation, and decision theory provides a natural mechanism for this task.
A Decision-Theoretic Approach
In a hypothesis testing problem we observe a value x of a random vector X with density (for convenience) f(xiB), and desire a conclusion about the hypotheses in a formal sense, as that can only be done through the likelihood ratio (Birnbaum, 1962; Royall, 1986) . Thus, we make the important distinction of referring to t/J(x) as a measure of accuracy, not evidence. In hypothesis testing we are assessing tfo(x) as an estimator of le 0 (0), while in set estimation we are concerned with the coverage of a set C(x). This can be expressed as assessing an estimator r(x) of IC(x)(O). Decision theoretic approaches to set estimation are the major concern of Robert (1989,1990) , and Bayesian solutions are treated by Berger (1985a,b; . Other papers dealing with estimation of accuracy in set estimation include Robinson (1979a,b) , Brown and Hwang (1989) , Hwang and Brown (1989) , George and Casella (1989) , Lu and Berger (1989) , and Robert and Casella (1990) .
Summary of Results
The two hypothesis testing problems we will be concerned with are the one-sided testing problem (1.5) versus where 0 0 is specified, and the two-sided testing problem (1.6) versus where 0 0 and 0 1 are specified. In either case we observe X = x, where X is a random vector with density f(xiO), and we base our inference on the statistic T(X) with density fT(t I 0).
In some cases, particularly in the two-sided testing problem, there are difficulties in defining a p-value. To eliminate these difficulties, we follow Lehmann (1986) and define it as follows. If Ra is the rejection region of an a-level test (most often UMPU) on which the pvalue, p(x), is to be based, we define (1.7) p(x) = inf{a: x £ Ra}, which eliminates ambiguities (as long as Ra is specified for each a). This also implicitly defines the p-value in terms of the random variable T(X).
In Section 2 we examine the loss functions of (1.3) in more detail. We argue that absolute error loss (on which Neyman-Pearson testing is based) may not be the most reasonable loss function, and show that squared error loss emerges as an attractive alternative. Throughout the remainder of the paper we concentrate on squared error loss. In Section 3 we develop the decision theory using squared error loss. We provide an example then investigate minimaxity and admissibility, and are able to characterize the admissible rules in both one-sided and two-sided testing. Application of these results is in Section 4, which also contains a rather startling set of conclusions about p-values. Under certain assumptions, the p-value is admissible in the one-sided problem and inadmissible in the twosided problem. However, it cannot be uniformly dominated by a proper Bayes rule in the two-sided problem. Section 5 contains a discussion, and there is an Appendix containing the proofs of the theorems in Section 3.
Consideration of Loss Functions
For the hypothesis testing problem (1.1), we now investigate reasonable forms for a loss function L(O,¢), to assess the worth of the estimator -y(x) of 1 60 (0). Since our parameter of interest has only two values, the loss function is of the form
A minimal property for a loss function to have is that it be proper (Lindley, 1985) . A proper loss function is one for which a Bayesian's best strategy is to tell the truth. (Whether one is a Bayesian, such a property is reasonable.) Thus, consider a prior distribution of 1r (O) on e. The posterior expected loss, of the loss function (2.1), given X=x, is
where 1r(Oix) = f(xl0)7r(O)/Je f(xl0)7r(O)d0 is the posterior distribution, and (2.3)
To say that the Bayesian's best strategy is to tell the truth is to say that the best estimator of Ie/0) is the Bayesian's best assessment of the probability of its occurrence. Thus,
<P(x)
Many common loss functions are proper, perhaps the most notable being squared error loss, corresponding to k=2 in (1.3), that is (2.5)
Another, less common, proper loss is logarithmic loss, given by
This loss also has the interesting property of yielding an infinite penalty if ¢(x) is as wrong as possible. Surprisingly, absolute error loss, corresponding to k=1 in (1.3), or
is not a proper loss. Thus, if consideration is restricted to proper losses, absolute error loss, which corresponds to classical Neyman-Pearson theory, would be eliminated.
The loss L 1 thus suffers from a foundational view, but its shortcomings have been known (perhaps informally) to many. For example, there is risk equivalence between (dreaded) randomized tests and estimators of Ie 0 ( 0). This fact partially explains why L 1 leads to 0-1 Bayes solutions. This equivalence is easy to see if we write the risk of the decision rule ¢(x) as 00 00 00
-oo -oo -oo which is the risk of the randomized test ¢(x) (or, in Neyman-Pearson terms, the risk of the critical function 1-¢(X) under 0-1 loss).
It is also possible, under suitable regularity conditions, to establish a converse. That is, the loss L 1 is the only loss under which there is a direct correspondence between estimators of Ie 0 ( 0) and randomized tests.
The fact that the loss L 1 is so closely related to Neyman-Pearson 0-1 loss leads to estimators that will not be smooth and, as such, may have problems (especially conditional ones). For example, suppose we have one observation from a n(0,1) density. A Bayes rule is ¢71" (x) = I[O,c](lxl), which corresponds to the Neyman-Pearson UMPU test. The problem with this rule is that the same inference is made whether x = 0 or lxl = c.
If we turn to a straightforward decision-theoretic evaluation, similar answers would be found. Consider the following theorem, which is easy to establish. 
We therefore see that the absolute error loss, Lh leads to a 0-1 Bayes solution, and can yield the usual Neyman-Pearson test in some cases (using point-mass priors). For the smoother loss L 2 we get a smoother Bayes rule, which is, of course, the Bayesian estimate of the indicator function Ie 0 ( 9). As we shall see, in some cases the p-value is a limit of rules of the form (2.9), an impossibility in other cases.
The decision-theoretic derivation leads to the same place that the proper loss argument led. If we consider choosing between L 1 and L 2 , the fact that for this loss function the Bayes rules are posterior probabilities is overwhelming. Since our goal is to estimate a probability, it is reassuring that the class of Bayes rules are exactly what we want. This observation is also of interest to non-Bayesians, since the class of Bayes rules is a subset of all admissible rules. Thus the loss L 2 not only provides a smooth alternative to L 1 , it provides an alternative that produces sensible rules.
Whether we argue based on decision theory or proper loss functions, L 2 emerges as an extremely reasonable alternative to L 1 • Since classical testing theory is equivalent to decision theory based on L 1 , examination of decision theory based on L 2 is in order.
Of course, most of our arguments for preferring L 2 loss over L 1 loss could just as well support the use of any proper loss over L 1 • {Any proper loss will result in the Bayes estimator of Ie 0 (9) being P(O e 9 0 lx).) Seen in this light, it might be argued that we should investigate the decision theory of other proper losses.
There are a number of reasons for not doing this. Firstly, the fact that all proper losses lead to the same Bayes estimator will result in similar decision-theoretic answers. Secondly, Hwang and Pemantle (1990) have found that L 2 plays a special role among proper losses. In investigating admissibility for a class of proper losses, they found that admissibility with respect to L 2 implied admissibility in the entire class.
Thirdly, there is a correspondence between admissibility with respect to L 2 and the nonexistence of relevant betting procedures, as described by Robinson (1979a) . This means that admissibility with respect to L 2 will guarantee acceptable conditional performance.
Combining all of the arguments in this section, we arrive at two conclusions. First, the loss L 1 has inherent problems, and thus alternative losses should be considered. Second, among reasonable alternative losses, L 2 emerges as an eminent choice. Thus, for the remainder of this paper, we concentrate on decision-theoretic hypothesis testing using L 2 loss.
Decision Theoretic Results.
Under the loss L 2 , we now examine some decision-theoretic consequences. To get a better idea of the situation, we first look at an example showing the behavior of some common rules. We then examine the criterion of minimaxity which, surprisingly, turns out to be a dead end. Then, admissibility is considered, and we are able to describe complete classes for both the one-sided and two-sided testing problem.
An Example.
To illustrate the risk behavior of some typical rules, we consider the simple situation of testing H 0 : 0~0 versus H 1 : 0>0, based on one observation, x, from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. Two obvious estimators of 1(8~0) are the p-value, P(Z>x), where Z is a standard normal random variable, and the Neyman-Pearson rule ¢c(x)=I(x<c), where c is a constant chosen according to the size of the test.
The risk of these rules is shown in Figure 1 along with the risk of two proper Bayes rules, using a n(O,r 2 ) prior, and the minimax rule ¢ 0 =~· The Bayes rules dominate the pvalue for 0 near zero, since the Bayes estimator, ¢r(x), is 2 1 ¢r(x) = P( Z>CJ+ 1 ) 2 x) > P(Z>x) = p-value.
However, as (} moves away from zero, the p-value becomes dominant. (For T bigger than 1, the risk of the Bayes rule is extremely close to that of the p-value.) The risk of the Neyman- We next characterize complete classes of decision rules for both the one-sided (1.5) and two-sided (1.6) testing problem. The proofs of the main theorems become quite technical, and are placed in an appendix.
For the complete class theorems we only consider the exponential family. We observe X=x, where X has a density in the one-parameter exponential family. Since estimators which are functions of the sufficient statistic T(x) are complete class, we confine attention to density functions defined on R, the range of T,
where log 'iJ!(B) = JRe(Jtf(tiB)dJl(t). Because the results are valid in discrete as well as continuous problems, the integrating measure has been left vague.
The rules in the complete class are essentially generalized estimators, after modification of the parameter space (see the Appendix) and allowance for truncation, which we now define. In the one-sided problem (1.5) an interval [t 1 , t 2 ] is a truncation set for the estimator i f> if t < t 1 implies if>(t) = 1 and t > t 2 implies </J(t) = 0. In the two-sided problem (1.6) an interval (t 1 , t 2 ] is a truncation set for the estimator <P if t E [tl> t 2 f implies <fJ(t) = 0. (The idea of a truncation set originated in Farrell (1968 and ¢ is given by (3.3) for t E ( t 1 , t 2 ), both integrals of (3.3) being finite.
As mentioned before, the essential point of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 is that the complete class is given by the generalized Bayes rules (almost). Thus, to establish admissibility, one would first check to see if a rule is generalized Bayes. In the next section we apply this strategy to the p-value.
Admissibility Considerations Under L 2 Loss
We now return to exploration of the behavior of the p-value, and find that under L 2 loss the results are quite interesting. There is a dichotomy occurring in the fate of the p-value, one that, perhaps, is reflected in the dissenting views of Berger and Sellke (1987) and Casella and Berger (1987a) . In the one-sided testing problem the p-value is, in many cases, admissible against the loss L 2 of (2.5), showing that the p-value is a reasonable measure of accuracy, a notion that agrees with Casella and Berger {1987a).
In the two-sided case, however, the answers are a bit more involved, in that the p-value is inadmissible but difficult to dominate. We are able to show that the usual p-value is not in the complete class of Theorem 3.2 (the two-sided problem), demonstrating its inadmissibility. This fact is consonant with the results of Berger and Sellke (1987) and Berger and Delampady (1987) concerning the failings of the p-value in the two-sided problem.
However, there is an interesting occurrence in the two-sided point null normal case:
Although the p-value is inadmissible, it cannot be dominated by any proper Bayes estimator.
Examples of Admissibility in the One-Sided Problem
We present a number of examples in which the p-value is generalized Bayes, hence admissible. This property probably carries over to other distributions, but in the following cases the admissibility of the p-value can be easily established. Proof: Using sufficiency, we can assume n = 1. Note that the p-value is generalized Bayes with respect to the Lebesgue measure prior (it is also a limit of Bayes rules against the sequence of n(0 0 ,r) priors). Furthermore, the (generalized) Bayes risk of the p-value is finite.
Therefore the p-value is admissible. 0
We now establish the admissibility of the p-value for some discrete distributions using a similar method. We summarize these results in the following theorem. We also note that in both the binomial and Poisson cases, generalization to an iid sample is immediate. Therefore, in a number of cases in the one-sided testing problem, the pvalue is admissible as an estimator of I( -oo,Oo)(O).
Admissibility in the Two-Sided Problem
The complete class theorem (Theorem 3.2) gives us a powerful tool for exploring admissibility of the p-value in the two-sided problem. The following theorem, which is a corollary of Theorem 3.2, allows us to reach some decisive conclusions about inadmissibility of the p-value. Theorem 4.4: For the hypothesis testing problem of (1.6), with loss function L 2 of (2.5) and
T(x) continuous, the p-value is inadmissible.
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing that the p-value given in (1.7) takes the value 1. For the hypotheses of (1.6), the p-value is based on a UMPU test of the form
where ¢(x) is the probability of accepting H 0 . The constants c 0 and c 1 are functions of a, the level of the test, that is, c 0 = c 0 ( a) and c 1 = c 1 (a).
We first deal with the case 8 0 # 8 1 • By Lehmann(1986, page 135) , c 0 (a) and c 1 (a) 
Arguments similar to those above, along with (5) and (6) of Lehmann(1986, page 136) , can be used to establish the inadmissibility of the p-value in this case. Although Theorem 4.4 is negative in its assessment of p-values, we will see that it is, perhaps, not as negative as it might first appear. We now look at the special case of testing a point null hypothesis about a normal mean, and find that the p-value cannot be dominated by any proper Bayes procedure. Thus, even though the p-value is inadmissible for testing a point null hypothesis, it is quite difficult to exhibit a better estimator. As before, sufficiency allows us to consider the case of one observation. based on one observation X from a n(O,l) density, and using loss function L 2 of (2.5), the pvalue cannot be dominated by any Bayes rule.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that 0 0 = 0. The Bayes rules for this problem are of the form
where f(xiO) is a n(O,l) density and I g(O)J.L(dO) = 1 (see Section 2), and the p-value is given -oo by
We consider three cases.
Case 1: 1r0 =1. In this case ¢1r (x) = 1. As 0-+oo, R( 0, p(x)) -+ 0 but R( 0,¢1r (x)) = 1 for 0 =/= 0, so ¢1r (x) cannot dominate p(x).
Case 2:1r 0 =0. In this case ¢1r(x) = 0 so R(o,¢1r) = 1 > R(O,p(x)) =~and ¢1r(x) cannot dominate p(x).
Case 3: 0 < 1r 0 < 1. We will show that as 0-+oo, R(O ,p(x)) becomes smaller than R(0,¢1r). First note that for sufficiently large lxl > a > 0, ¢1r (x) > p(x). This follows from the fact that (4.4)
for sufficiently large lxl, where 0 =xis the maximum likelihood estimator of 0.
For 0 :f:. 0 0 , the difference in risks is given by
and from (4.4), by continuity, there exists an t > 0 such that ¢""(x) 2 -p(x) 2 > t for all a < lxl < a+t. Hence generalized Bayes estimator based on a complicated prior, Hwang and Pemantle (1990) constructed an estimator that dominates the p-value. That estimator was only constructed for that purpose, however, and will probably not gain widespread use in practice. Thus, the p-value will, no doubt, remain as an often used estimator of accuracy, and although inadmissible in the two-sided problem, may not be too bad.
Discussion
The formulation of hypothesis testing as a decision-theoretic estimation problem leads to results, that is, estimators, that are more satisfying than the conclusions from NeymanPearson theory. These estimators, which may be considered measures of evidence possess formal optimality properties. Viewing the testing problem as one of estimating an indicator of H 0 , and separating it from the set estimation problem, leads to estimators that are more desirable in practice.
The failure of minimaxity to provide any interesting results for the loss Lk of (1.3), with k > 1, is surprising, and we are unsure bow to interpret this. The fact that ¢ 0 = ~ is minimax was anticipated, but the fact that it is unique minimax was not. Therefore, we have to accept the fact that for strictly convex loss functions, if we use a data-dependent measure of evidence, we will sometimes do worse than the "no-data" rule ¢ 0 = ~-Minimaxity may prove to be a useful criterion, however, in any further decision-theoretic study using absolute error loss.
The dichotomy between the (rather straightforward) one-sided problem and the (more involved) two-sided problem is illustrated by the fate of the p-value. It is generally admissible in the one-sided case (being a limit of Bayes rules) but inadmissible in the twosided case (not corresponding to any generalized Bayes rule). These conclusions are in line with, and partially explain, the opposing arguments of Sellke (1987) and Delampady (1988) , who contended that the p-value is unreasonable in two-sided problems, and Casella and Berger (1987) , who contended that the p-value can be reasonable in one-sided problems.
What is even more startling, however, is the inability of any Bayes rule to dominate the p-value in the two-sided point null problem. Unless we can find a practical dominating estimator, this gives the p-value a position enjoyed by few estimators (the positive-part James-Stein estimator comes to mind), an inadmissible estimator for which it is difficult to exhibit a dominating estimator. Thus, even in the two-sided case, the p-value could be a Stein (1956) . 0
In order to prove the best possible result it is necessary to modify the parameter space.
We discuss this for the two-sided problem. Let and Define
and Because R 2 (-,tjJ) can be obtained as a limit of R 1 (-,t/J) the following lemma is easy to verify. From (3.3), for almost all t 1 < t < t 2 , 0 < .tim ¢Pi(t) = ¢(t) .
J--+00
If necessary by choice of subsequence we may assume ~-'oj converges to a probability measure Jlo weakly so that
. tim Jf( tio)Jl 0 ·( dO) = Jf( t10)p0( dO) .
J--+00
~
It then follows for almost all t 1 < t < t 2 that .tim Jf(ti0)1J 1 ·(d0) exists and is finite.
J--+00 J Thus, if t 1 < t 2 , then standard arguments may be used to show there exists a limiting ufinite measure 1-'I (and a subsequence if necessary), such that p 1 j --+ Ill and if t 1 < t < t 2 then
Thus for almost all t 1 < t < t 2 , ¢(t) can be expressed as in It follows at once that in the exponential case ¢7r(t) is nonincreasing. ¢ as an almost sure limit of Bayes estimators is thus equal almost surely to a nonincreasing function. Without loss of generality assume ¢ is nonincreasing.
Let e = {t : 0 < ¢(t) < 1}. Then e is an interval. We assume e contains two distinct points, hence has nonvoid interior. Define 1'7r(t) by Thus ¢7r = 1/1+r1r(t). If t E e, then 0 < r7r(t) < oo. Remark. This argument is still correct for the discrete exponential families. Here the interesting points of the truncation set e are atoms of the integrating measure. For each atom t E e, 0 < eim ¢?rn(t) < 1 and the above argument goes through.
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